This article has been written by Aditi Ananya from Chanakya National Law University

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

In the Indian legal system, the seminal case “Shreya Singhal v. Union of India” AIR 2015 SC 1523 [Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012] is extremely important.

The case of Shreya Singhal v Union of India concerns the constitutional validity of section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and centres on the basic right to “Freedom of Speech and Expression” as guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

IMPORTANT SECTIONS / ARTICLES:

Section 66A,69A,79 of the Information Technology Act ,2000.
Section 118(D) of the Kerala Police Act.
Articles 14,19,19(1)(A) & 19(2) Of the Constitution of India.

FACTS

Two females, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, were detained in Mumbai in 2012 under section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for their harsh Facebook remarks criticising the city’s shutdown for Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray’s funeral.

Their arrest sparked widespread indignation (frustration) despite the police eventually releasing them and dropping their charges.

Many argued that section 66A should be repealed, claiming that the police had taken advantage of this section of the Information and Technology (IT) Act, 2000, which penalises anyone who transmits grossly offensive information through a computer resource or communication device, or who does so knowing it is false and does so with the intent to annoy, inconvenience, danger, insult, injury, hatred, or ill will.

The crimes covered by this legislation fell within the category of cognizable offences, which gave the police the authority to make arrests without a warrant.

This had the unintentional consequence of stifling public opinion by enabling the police to detain anybody voicing protest. It was also perceived as a violation of the freedom of speech and expression, which is a basic right protected by Article 19(1)(a).

Shreya Singhal, a law student, petitioned the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, questioning the provision’s constitutional validity. The language, according to her, was imprecise, too general, and restrictive of free speech.

Justices J. Chelameswar and J. Rohinton Fali Nariman made up the division bench of the Supreme Court that heard the case.

The government maintained throughout the hearing that section 66A was required to suppress hate speech and stop the propagation of false information. Conversely, the petitioners claimed the clause was being used to suppress legitimate criticism and dissent. In light of this, the court informed the government and requested a response to the petition.

Following 2013, the government amended the Act. In Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73, the Supreme Court of India first issued an interim order that forbade any arrests conducted under Section 66A unless they were authorised by senior police personnel.

However, there was still a lot of ambiguity in the Act and it did not define what constituted an offence, so it remained troublesome. A significant public uproar resulted from the increasing number of lawsuits being brought under section 66A in the meantime.

But, the number of petitions submitted before the Honourable Supreme Court under this clause substantially rose. These petitions were subsequently combined into a single Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which took on the name Shreya Singhal V. Union of India. The Court discussed the legality of the clause in the present instance.

REASONS FOR CRITICISM OF SECTION 66A

There was uncertainty on the definition of “offensive.” There were many possible meanings of the term because of its broad sense. The petitioners in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India contended that the incredibly broad interpretations of Section 66A permitted capricious interpretations by law enforcement.

It was believed that the term “offensive” was subjective. Something that might have seemed insignificant to one person could trigger another’s complaint, which could result in an arbitrary arrest.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 66A, 69A, and 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 are constitutionally valid?
Whether 66A of the IT Act, 2000, violates the Right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a)?
Is this clause a legitimate limitation on the freedom of expression and speech?
Does this clause violate Article 14 of the Indian Constitution?
Is this provision likely to be overturned because it is too ambiguous and broad?
Whether this section is vague and overbroad and, therefore, liable to be struck down?
Whether the Information Technology (Procedure & Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009 and Information Technology “Intermediary Guidelines” Rules, 2011are constitutionally valid?
Whether Section 79(3) (b) and Information Technology “Intermediary Guidelines” Rules, 2011 is constitutionally valid or not?
Is the Kerala Police Act’s Section 118(d) constitutionally valid?

ARGUMENTS

BY PETITIONERS

Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, which declares that the right to freedom of speech and expression is a basic one, is infringed upon by section 66A of the Information Technology Act. Because the limit of the section isn’t specified and the various terminologies used there aren’t defined explicitly, this section is extremely ambiguous and susceptible. It gives law enforcement officials total latitude to interpret these laws in accordance with their own judgements and interpretations. Additionally, the petitioner claimed that these statutes are vague, arbitrary, and subjective. By restricting people’s capacity to voice their concerns and oppose to policies, it may be utilised by different governments for their own self-interests, which is against Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, that safeguards individual liberties and life. The petitioner also argued that Article 14 of the Indian Constitution requires “intelligible differentia” or “difference capable of being understood,” which is lacking from this clause. This legislation will carry several meanings to different persons. This violates article 14 as a result.

BY RESPONDENTS

Respondents disputed the petitioner’s writ petition’s maintainability in this case. One area of disagreement among respondents was the boundaries of the legislative and judicial branches of government. They stated that the court can only get involved if the third part of the Indian constitution is broken and that the legislature’s role is to carry out the aspirations of the people. Articles 12 through 35 of Part III of the Indian Constitution address people’s fundamental rights. They argued that the writ petition as a whole was unsupportable and driven by politics. They questioned the petitioner’s reasoning, in which she protested to the section’s vagueness. Respondents claimed that even while the Act had an arbitrary nature, this should never be basis for declaring it completely unconstitutional. They said that the petitioner’s whole case relies on the possibility that this section may infringe upon people’ basic rights. They continued by saying that a law’s constitutionality shouldn’t be determined by using these presumptions.

JUDGEMENT

In a historic ruling on March 24, 2015, the Supreme Court of India upheld the petitioners’ contention and emphasised the value of free speech and expression in democracies by ruling that section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was unconstitutional because it “was violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2).” The freedom to speech and expression is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), although the state is permitted to set “reasonable restrictions” on how this right may be used by 19(2).

By using the severability concept, the Supreme Court solely invalidated Section 66-A, which was at odds with Part III of the Constitution. The remainder of the statute was upheld as constitutional, with the exception of this particular portion.

Section 66A states that it is unlawful to transmit content via a computer resource or a communication device that is egregiously offensive, menacing, or that aggravates, discomforts, puts people in danger, obstructs, insults, causes injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will. Additionally, the clause said that anybody who wilfully and deliberately spreads material that is known to be false, detrimental to national integration, or likely to urge others to commit crimes may be punished.

The court ruled that section 66A was too broad and ambiguous. As a result, it failed the legality test established by Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits justifiable limitations on the right to free speech and expression.

Furthermore, the court decided that the vague phrases employed in section 66A left too much to the discretion of law enforcement, which resulted in the statute being applied arbitrarily and unfairly.

The court further found that because section 66A criminalised speech that was not directly related to any harm or threat to public order, national security, or any other legitimate state interest, it went beyond the reasonable limits that might be imposed under Article 19(2).

Consequently, the court declared that section 66A was unconstitutional, citing its chilling impact on free speech and expression as well as its potential to be utilised to stifle criticism of the government and opposition.

The court observed that any attempt to restrict the right to free speech and expression would be in violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution as the Internet has emerged to be a necessary component of that freedom.

The court emphasised that any limitations on free speech or expression have to be proportionate, well-thought-out, and serve the relevant purpose. The court further found that free speech and expression could not be restricted by imprecise or vague legal requirements.

Furthermore, the court determined that section 66A was not proportional to the desired outcome and was not specifically designed to further a lawful state interest.

The decision maintains the core principle that freedom of speech and expression is the cornerstone of a democratic society. Any attempt to restrict this freedom has to be properly examined to make sure it makes sense and is appropriate.

The court supported the rights to express dissent and criticism as well as the ability to receive, communicate, and share ideas and information.

Additionally, the court distinguished between “Free Speech & Hate Speech.” Hate speech is mainly subjective. It is not possible to classify any innocent remark as hate speech. The court mentioned discussion, advocacy, and incitement—three ideas that are central to the idea of free speech. The limitation of freedom occurs when debate or advocacy on a subject reaches a point where it becomes offensive.

The bench also read down Section 79, which establishes fundamental guidelines for the interaction between governmental bodies and for-profit online platforms.

According to Section 79, an intermediary cannot be held legally or in any other way accountable for any data, information, or communication link that is hosted or made available by a third party on its platform.

CONCLUSION

In a remarkable verdict, the Supreme Court of India invalidated Sections 66 A and 118 of the Kerala Police Act while affirming Sections 69 A and 79 as constitutional, subject to Section 79 (3) (b).

The ruling in the Shreya Singhal case is noteworthy because it emphasises the value of free speech and expression in democracies and the necessity of regulations that are specific, unambiguous, and carefully tailored to serve legitimate state objectives.

The ruling emphasises how crucial it is to make sure that laws restricting free speech are specifically designed to accomplish their goals and do not interfere with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.

The court’s decision reinforces the judiciary’s position as a guardian of individual liberties and rights against the state’s overreach. It conveys the idea that people are free to object to unlawful laws and ask the courts to defend them.

The case also underlines how important social media and the Internet are in influencing public opinion and giving free speech a forum. The court acknowledged that using the Internet to exercise one’s right to free speech and expression is essential. It recognised the necessity of striking a balance between the conflicting demands of regulation and free expression in the digital era.

The fact that Section 66 A constituted an overreach by the State is widely established. It was abused by capricious behaviour that restricted expression and individual liberty and was frequently disproportionate and discriminating.

At the heart of the Indian Constitution is the fundamental ideal of freedom. Since free speech and expression are fundamental to both our identity as citizens and our form of government as democracies, as well as being a fundamental human right, it has become even more crucial to fight for their protection.

The court has provided exceptional and improved clarity to India’s free speech jurisprudence in this case. The Shreya Singhal v. Union of India decision is still viewed as a major court critique of governmental violations of the right to free speech and expression.